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Case ~ o. 9080 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
r \ L E 0 
) I~ "'\ (~ ~J·.1 
LEON1\RD ~fEADS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, __ 
--·--- -.· 
~vs.-
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE, Adminis~ 
trator of the estate of JOHN RlCH-
ARD SALMON, Deceased, and J\.IER-
RILL B. COLTO~, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
·~ 
\ • [" 1!- 11 : ~ :~ l, ' ' 
.. ••,1 I I""'W' ..... 
·s-.- ·- -~ ~ ~: r: c~J ~-,.t: \; ~ ~ ~~ 
iJP·---··-~ 
PETITION FOR R-E-HEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT TIIEREOF 
RIC It & STRONG, 
Counsel for DefeiUlant and 
Respondent 
604-610 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
___ ........ 11111£11 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEOX A.l~:t) 1\fEADS, ) 
P la-i.ntijf and Appellant, 
-vs .. -
RlCHARD C. DIBBL~~~.:. Admini:,;- \ 
trator of the e!::tate of JOliN RICH-
A ltD S_.:\L·),l ()X~ l)t•tleased, and I\IER-
ltlLL B .. C()LTOK,: 
Defe ~~ (/({uf.s a.·nil Re8 po-1~~l en I .s ~ 
Case X o. !H ~S( I 
Cornes nO\V Richard (~. Dlbblee, admini~ttator of 
the estate of ~T ohn J::,ichard Salrnon, deeeased1 defendant 
and respondent in the above-eaptioncd rnattert and vnr-
suant to Itule 76 (e) of the l~tah Rules or Civil Procedure~ 
petitions the above-entitled c.onrt for a re-hearing of the 
case on tlte following grounds and for the f ollov.ing 
reasons~ to-wit: 
1. That the court in deciding the case did so by 
judicial legislation Vlithout support in fact or la\v for 
so doing4 
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2 
·} rl~hat the court erred in interpreting Section 7S-
ll-1~ Ctah Code Annotated. 
:t That the decision of the court is wholly incon-
~i!5tcnt vlith and cannot be reconciled ''lith the court's 
vrevious holdings under the sarne statu tc. 
t'5'rA rrEliEN1~ OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT IN DECIDING THE CASE DID SO BY 
.. JUDI·CIAL LEGISLATION WITHOUT SUPPORT IN FACT 
OR LAW 1-"'0R SO DOING+ 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTION 
78-11-12 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
POINT IIL 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS WHOLLY INCON~ 
SJSTENT WITH AND CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH 
THE COURT~s PREVIOUS HOLDINGS UNDER THE SAME 
~TATUTE. 
BRII~~F 1~ SlJPPORT OF l)~~TITION 
.Sjnce all of the points are inter-related, they ·will 
be argued together. The n1ajorit.y opinion is based upon 
an analysis of Section 78-11-12 r:tah Code Annotated. In 
reaching its result the majority opinion found it necessary 
to break down the second .section of one sentence of the 
~tatute into five subdivisions and then to rearrange and 
rewrite the subdivisions to read in an entirely different 
1nanner than the statute itselft The grammatical gym· 
nast ies clearly indicates that the court resorted to judiw 
~~iallegislation. If the Legislature had intended the stat-
ute to read as rearranged and set forth in the majority 
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opinion~ it "·ould have ~o \Yarded the ~tatute. ~.,urther­
Ino l"{. .. , in r-earranging and rC\\Ti! i ng the sta t11te, the 
lllajority opinion \vholly ignores t l1c fir~t pottion of the 
~(\rd.r.nr.e ~~hi(' h ~ irn ply state~ that '~ ea uses of act.i on ari s-
ing· out oi' pl1y~ical injury to the person or death ~ ~~ shall 
not abate upon the death of the \Vrongdoer.'' TheRe ¥lord~ 
hero me absolutely Ineaningle~~ in Y! e \V of tl tP 1naj ority 
opinion. l f" the Legislat urc had intended the\ result 
ac~ 1 i evcd in tll e n -.:1j or i t~v opinion, it \\~ould ha vc been 
'vholly unncces8ary to n1ake any ~tatement about cause~ 
of action not abating. It could have 'vritten a statutt~ 
along the lines aR rearranged hy the court in the majority 
opinion. This it did not do. If \Ve are to give effect to the 
first portion of the sentence and not disregard it.~ the 
~econd half of the sentence, as indicated by Judge Hen-
raid in his dissenting opinion, Inerc]y indicates ,~lho the 
parties plaintiff n1ay be depending upon the facts pre-
vailing and the applicability of the statute thereto. Only 
in this 'vay can the 'vhole statute be given i t.s proper 
tneanmg. 
The majority opinion then goes on to st.ate that if 
there is any ambiguity in the statute, it should be resolved 
in favor of common sense, and thereby requires a decision 
in favor of the plaintiff. This reasoning requires careful 
analysis. Is it common sense to hold that the first portion 
of one sentence of a statute deprives a person of a right, 
and that the second portion of the sa1ne sentence gjves it 
hack to him1 
In the case of Fretz v. Anderson., 5 Utah (2d) 290~ 
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300 Pae. (2d) ()4~, this sa•ne ~tatute \\··as thoroughly and 
completely analyzed. The opinion in that case 'vas vlrit-
ten by one ol' the Judges vlho has concurred in the tuajor-
ity opinion in the l>rcscnt ca~e. The opinion vlas unani~ 
Inou8. ThP ..Judge \VritirJg· the opinion in the present ea~e 
and the other '-'udge concurring therein both participated 
in the Fretz r-nse and concurred in that opinion~ \\re 
as~unte that the court in that case applied the smne COin-
Ill on ~ ense rule of 'vhich it Jl OV{ ~peaks. In that case the 
court had no trouble \vith the language of the statuter It 
considered the 1vhole statute. In fact the 'vhole statute, 
and not merely the first portion thereof, is clearly set 
forth in the opinion~ .A. t that time the court felt that the 
statute \va8 clear. It~ only conclusion after considering 
the statute in its entirety was ' .. the cau8e of action cannot 
arise at a time beyond the life of the tort fcasor.H '\Te 
assume that it 'vas applying com.Inon sen 8e '"hen it reach-
ed the result which it did~ In that case it was not deter-
mined 'vhether the tort feasor had d.ied before the plain-
tiff's accident 1.,he court reversed the case, granting a 
ne'v trial in order that. the parties could muster their 
evidence on this one missing phase of the accident, 
stating: 
"~** The matter should be submitted to the 
jury 'vith an explanation that if they believe from 
all of the facts and cj renin stances disr..losed by the 
evidence that the decea t::ied survived the first acci-
dent~ then the cause of action survived and, other 
factors 11 eeessary to the plaintiff's cause being 
present, the plainti.ff could recover; on the other 
hand, if f-rom a1l o I the fa-cts and c i 1~c liUl stances 
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d isc[o,.,,ed by the r..r·idcnce they do not believe that 
th.e decea .. 5ed Sl( rr·iced the f"i·n·il cullisio··n then the 
pla·intiff ro1.dd ·not recot~er.'·' (Italics ours) 
In the present r·n~L· \Ve l1ave the circu1nstanr.e 1vhich 
\\'a~ 1ni~sing in the Fretz case. It 'vas clearly conceded 
in the rnajority opinion that F~llcn '~ cause of action did 
not come into exi.~·d.encc until after the tort feasor 'va~ 
dead, the majority OJ)inion stating: '\John having died 
before Ellen, there \vas no liability to perpetuate against 
hi.rn upon her death \vhich \voulrl not abate under the 
provisions of 78-11-12." 
Common se,n::.e to u~ \Vould scent to require that the 
court 'vhich unanin1ously decided the Fretz case v&tould 
have to find in our favor in the present cat;e. In fact, it 
is amazing to us that the .. fudge \vho "\Vrote and the tTudgcs 
who r.oncurred in the decision in the Fretz case eould nu\v 
\vrite and concur in the decision i.n the present case. 
X either the Judge \Vho wrote the opinj_on nor the Judges 
concurrjng therein had any difficulty in eonst.ruing the 
enti ,.e statute at that time. Between the decisions of the 
t\vo ease~ tl1ere ha~ been no amendment or change in the 
statute. Is it common sense to find a statute clear and to 
require an interpretation one \Vay in one ca-Re and then 
require an entirely different interpretation in another 
case 1 "\V e submit that a statute v,.~hich has not been 
changed or runended cannot as a matter of c.ommon sense 
at one time be found to clearly require a dceision one 
\vay and at another time compel a decision in exactly the 
opposite direction. This is neither common sense nor 
logic. If what the court say~ in the present opinion is 
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right, then \VlH.tt it :said in the Fretz ra~fl v,:as V{rong .. 1 f 
the plainti l'f in the l_)l"CHCnt action (+all maintain the suit, 
then the plaintiff jn the l',retz ca~e should have been able 
to have 1naintained the f.;Uit. The decision in the present 
ease leaves the status of the lav~r in this state as inter-
preted by this court in confusion. The tv{o cases cannot 
be reconciled. These two cases illustrate the trouble into 
\vhich a court gets and the confusion v.rhich arises 'vhen 
a court makes judicial legislation .. If a statute ca1l~ for 
varying interpretations at different times, then something 
must be the 1natter \\-i.th the f.;tatute itself. If so, it is up 
to the Legi~Jature and not for the courts to correet. th1~ 
condition. 
Although the majority opinion Inay reach a desirabl~ 
result, this i~ no ground or justification for the court by 
judicial I e gisla t ion to realize that result. 
As indicated by this court in the case of Brown r. 
W·i!lltt1nan 1 47 U tall 31, 151 Pac. ;166: 
~""\.Vhilc the common-la'\t~ rule js a harsh one~ 
and its enforcement in this case is pecu1iarly un-
just, \\·'C nevertheless can s \::·e no \ray of es ca.ping 
it. The right and power, as ·well as the duty, of 
creating right~ and to provide remedies, lies vntJt 
the Legislature~ and not with the courts. Court~ 
can on1y protect and enforc~ existing rights, and 
they may do that only in accordance \vith estab· 
lished and knovm. remedies." 
The argument of har~hness or unintentional omission i~ 
not enough. The Legislature is the only one 'vho ran 
correct the deficiency. 
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COXCLUSIOX 
'Ve respectfully submit that the petition for re-
hearing should be granted because it is apparent that the 
court has resorted to judicial legislation in reaching its 
result and that the decision 'vhen properly analyzed 1 s not 
based upon the common sense construction of which the 
court speaks. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG, 
Attorne-J-Js fo·r Defenda-nt and 
Respondent 
604-610 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
•. / 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
